В.М. Чернов о модернизации Сталина by Konovalova, Olga V. & Коновалова, О.В.
– 1886 –
Journal of  Siberian Federal University.  Humanities & Social Sciences 11 (2014 7) 1886-1893 
~ ~ ~
УДК 94 (47)
V.M. Chernov on “Stalin’s Modernization”
Оlga V. Konovalova*
Siberian Law Institute FDCS of Russia
20 Rokossovskogo Str., Krasnoyarsk, 660131, Russia
Received 02.07.2014, received in revised form 29.07.2014, accepted 15.09.2014
The article is based on the analysis of the materials from domestic and foreign archives. It considers 
the views of V.M. Chernov, an outstanding figure in the world and Russian socialist movement, the 
leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, an ideologist of neo-populism on modernization of the country 
during “Stalin’s socialism” era.
Keywords: V.M. Chernov, socialist-Revolutionary Party, political emigration, the USSR, 
modernization, industrialization, collectivization, totalitarianism.
Research area: History.
 © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved
* Corresponding author E-mail address: olgav-k@yandex.ru
Introduction
The strategic problems of modernization, 
which are on modern Russia’s agenda, urgently 
require the comprehension of the Soviet practice 
of the country’s cardinal breakthrough to new 
technologies. The assessment of this process 
from alternative Bolshevism ideological and 
methodological positions is of a special current 
interest. V.M. Chernov, a prominent figure in the 
world and Russian socialist movement, the leader 
of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, a neo-
populism ideologist, analyzed a specific character 
of the USSR’s development in his works of the 
1920-1940-s while outside the country in his 
compelled political emigration.
Statement of the problem
Victor Mikhailovich regarded the Bolshevik 
option of the country’s modernization from the 
democratic positions. Thus, at times ideological 
prejudgment and rejection of Stalinist methods 
of modernization penetrated his estimates 
(Konovalova 2008, Konovalova 2009). However, 
detecting the reasons and features of this process, 
V.M. Chernov first of all proved to be a thoughtful 
researcher and, therefore, managed to reveal a 
number of important historical, civilization bases 
and regularities of the modernization process of 
Russia.
Discussion
The socialist-revolutionaries’ leader 
indissolubly associated Stalin’s breakthrough 
to a bright future with the country’s historical 
past, its cultural and political traditions. In his 
opinion “militaristic methods” of modernization 
are caused by historical features of the country’s 
development. On the one hand, they are 
determined by “secular autocracy domination” 
and the complex of “spiritual Caesarism”, 
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engraved on the psychology of power and the 
people (Chernov 1924). Neither the destruction 
of the old state machinery, nor the overthrow of 
autocracy and exploiter classes could overcome 
them. It turned out to be much easier to overthrow 
the external autocracy rather than the people’s 
internal, psychological that penetrated into their 
soul due to the force of a historical custom. It is 
considered to be interesting that Chernov came 
to the conclusion that the Bolsheviks’ managerial 
methods corresponded to the type of the people’s 
political consciousness and political culture in 
the late 1920-s. In 1927 in “Revoliutsionnaiia 
Rossiia” (“Revolutionary Russia”) he wrote: “An 
orgy of punishments by a guillotine or a KGB 
cellar, given a special governmental status and 
despiritualized by bureaucracy, will not make it 
possible to forget another orgy – an orgy of mass 
lynch laws …, which were, unfortunately, in 
people’s hands. Bolshevism only “concentrated 
a certain aspect of the revolution’s ochlocratic 
tendency” (Chernov 1927).
The socialist-revolutionaries’ leader 
emphasized that the country had already had 
a precedent of a historical breakthrough at the 
expense of internal resources and people’s basic 
needs. It was achieved during the formation of 
the Russian Empire by means of the “police-run 
state”. The Bolsheviks relied on the people’s 
age-old habit to slavery and decided to drive 
it in socialism by “Peter the Great’s bludgeon” 
(Konovalova 2009, 230). Chernov saw “a 
certain mix of Napoleonism, Petrograndism and 
Nietzscheanism” in carrying out industrialization 
at any cost, at the people’s expense. According 
to the socialist-revolutionary, the Bolsheviks’ 
credo was “not production for the people, but 
the people for production” (Ibid., 202). In his 
opinion, there was a substitution of purpose 
and means of the policy in the communists’ 
consciousness. The country’s industrialization 
turned from a means to achieve an individual’s 
and the society’s wellbeing into an end in itself, 
and an individual turned into a means to achieve 
this purpose. 
The neo-populist truly noticed a secret of 
such a metamorphosis in the influence of the 
events of World War I on public consciousness. 
Chernov claimed that though the Bolsheviks 
were antagonistic to the war in Zimmerwald, 
they didn’t mean it to be a means of fight, but 
its bourgeois class shell. They were against the 
war not from the pacifistic positions – for the 
sake of peace. They wished an imperialistic war 
to become a civil one. In this case the October 
Revolution, according to Chernov, was “a 
lawful child of war”, and moreover, its direct 
continuation and transferring from external 
borders to up-country. The Bolsheviks introduced 
“all the methods of war” and military ways of 
managing the society into the practice of political 
and economic life (Ibid., 229). Militarization 
of a political life resulted in the formation of a 
system of dictatorship, undivided authority. In 
1928 in his article “On the issue of dictatorship 
and democracy” the socialist-revolutionary noted 
that similarly to a prerogative of the commander 
in the war, the power acquired the right to dispose 
of the people’s lives and deaths, it made “a citizen 
a cannon fodder”; “the Order and Subordination” 
but not rights and freedoms became a priority 
(Chernov 1928, 9).
On the economic plane the concentration of 
all resources in hands of the “State, the Owner” 
and directive planning, that is imposing of a 
plan on the national economy by the central 
power’s orders that inevitably resulted in the 
mass consumer’s exploitation and, finally, 
in the aspiration for external might, were the 
signs of borrowing of militaristic methods 
and their introduction to a peaceful life. The 
population in a militaristic society is obliged 
to sacrifice everything with no regard to their 
urgent needs.
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At the same time the socialist-revolutionary 
recognized that modernization tasks were 
dictated by a historical need to overcome the 
country’s backwardness and connected with the 
failure of S.Yu. Witte’s policy. The first variant 
of capitalist modernization was insolvent for two 
main reasons. The world economic crisis of the 
early 1900-s contributed to the capital outflow 
from Russia, and the peasants’ bankruptcy and 
unresolved agrarian issue prevented the use 
of internal reserves. The political elite of the 
Russian Empire was unable to offer the ways of 
solving the contradictions of the modernization 
process. This led to the crash of the empire during 
World War I. As Chernov concluded, the imperial 
regime didn’t pass the “examination of the world 
military catastrophe”.
In the 1930-s the socialist-revolutionary 
stated that, having got the power, the Communist 
party “abolished capitalism by the decree” but had 
to continue what the imperial elite didn’t finish. 
And it stands to reason that industrialization 
became “a soul of the Soviet economic policy”. 
The Soviet power had to undertake “the menial 
work of bourgeoisie, the failure”. However, the 
Soviet state didn’t have outer colonies as sources 
of accumulation used by the West European 
bourgeoisie in their time. During the NEP 
(New Economic Policy) period the Bolsheviks 
didn’t manage to attract foreign capital the way 
it was done by S.Yu. Witte. Despite the official 
recognition of the Soviet power Europe didn’t trust 
the Bolsheviks who refused to pay the debts of the 
tsarist and Provisional Government and pursued 
the policy of destabilization of the situation 
in Europe within the doctrine of Comintern 
(Communist International). Besides, there were 
no spare capitals in Europe. Europe itself needed 
investments; “healing its wounds” after the World 
War, it asked for the USA’s help; and as for the 
Bolsheviks’ relations with “the world creditor”, 
they were very intense. Therefore they had to 
find some internal sources instead of using the 
external economic resources. In these conditions, 
according to the socialist-revolutionary, the 
Russian peasantry was compelled to play a role 
of an “internal colony” (Konovalova 2008, 138-
139).
Thus, Chernov stated, Stalinist 
collectivization is subordinated to the 
industrialization policy. To implement it 
successfully the government started a forced 
proletarization of the village, having practically 
declared a war to “the peasants’ independent 
farming” (Ibid., 193). In response to the 
government’s actions the peasantry started a 
“small war”. The initial forms of this war were 
peaceful. They slaughtered the cattle, caused 
stock damage, and aimlessly left the villages. 
Then the war started the methods of spontaneous 
guerrilla war (Chernov 1930, 1-3). Despite all 
the OGPU diligences, the socialist-revolutionary 
emigration learnt about the peasants’ mass 
struggles during collectivization. In his letter 
dated February 1, 1932 to the members of the USA 
socialist-revolutionary organization Chernov 
reported that the Bolshevist authorities were 
compelled to undertake “a furious mobilization 
of the communist front-ranks, similar to the 
Kronstadt rebellion” not to lose their control over 
the situation in the village.
In these conditions the socialist-
revolutionaries’ leader expected the government, 
frightened by the scale of the peasants’ discontent, 
to make concessions. Exactly in such a focus he 
analyzed a well-known Stalin’s article devoted to 
the criticism of the “excesses on places”. However, 
he didn’t consider the government’s concessions 
to be fundamental ones. He believed that they 
couldn’t affect the nature of collectivization 
seriously as the process was of an irreversible 
character. “Stalin is not the lord of the general 
flow of things any more. … He evoked the spirits, 
and he is not a person to conjure them”, Chernov 
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wrote. “The colossus of state industrialization on 
clay feet of the peasants’ independent agriculture, 
killed alive, obeys its own law of gravitation, 
coupling and disintegration”, noted Victor 
Mikhailovich with bitterness (Konovalova 2009, 
194). 
Thus, by the end of the 1930-s Chernov was 
compelled to admit that the Bolsheviks had no 
other alternative except industrialization at the 
expense of the peasantry. It was historically and 
politically predetermined. At the same time he 
considered forms and methods of industrialization 
essentially wrong not only morally but also 
from the point of economic feasibility. Put 
into practice at the expense of limiting the 
population’s consumption and backwardness 
of branches of light industry and agriculture, 
such modernization of the country did not only 
aggravate social contradictions in the country but 
also caused an essential decrease in the people’s 
general cultural and economic level. Dragging 
the present generation to “economic Golgotha” 
for the future, the Bolsheviks broke the law of 
continuous development of human needs which 
motivate a human’s vigorous creative activity. He 
predicted that “light freezing” of elementary needs 
would lead to the most harmful consequences 
in the future. Chernov considered gradual, 
voluntary cooperation of the peasantry to be an 
alternative to total collectivization. It was better 
to act according to Lenin’s conception in this 
process – “better less but of a higher quality”. He 
thought it to be better to collectivize a small part 
of the peasants’ farms as it could be supplied with 
better seeds and equipment. In this case collective 
farms would become economically profitable; 
they wouldn’t be credited at the expense of the 
state and turn to be “convincing instead of being 
a scarecrow” for the peasants.
Recognizing correctness of the country’s 
industrialization course as a direction of the 
economic policy, Chernov objected to the ways 
and means of its implementation, proposed by the 
Bolsheviks. He thought that concentration of all 
resources in heavy industry would inevitably lead 
to the disproportion in economy – to an “ugly 
hegemony … of heavy industry over light industry, 
to self-sufficing manufacture of the production 
means over that of consumption means”. It would 
cause such a feature of the Soviet economy as 
“hypertrophy of mechanical engineering” which 
he qualified as “the abnormality, directly hurting 
the eyes” or “elephantiasis” of Soviet economy” 
(Chernov 1942, 41).
Reflecting on the results of the first five-year 
plans, Chernov paid attention to the inconsistent 
results of Stalin’s industrialization. On the one 
hand, these were “production giants which were 
as if from the other world, couldn’t become 
a part of the country’s overall economy and 
required absolutely different living and cultural 
conditions”. On the other hand, these were 
exhaustion, impoverishment and starvation of the 
masses, lack of trained workers and engineers, 
uninterrupted supply with all necessary things 
for manufacture. The built industrial giants 
weren’t used to the full. If left unfinished they 
drag out “inactive existence”, being partially or 
even entirely “on preservation”, in hope to be 
used in distant future. The socialist-revolutionary 
noted that at the same time “a rapid growth of 
modern technology turns the equipment … into a 
quickly outdated one”. Therefore “in many cases 
the intensive construction, for which there is the 
lack of all necessary conditions, turns to be a 
fruitless, anti-economic squandering of national 
resources”.
“We could hope, – he argued, – that this 
feature of the Soviet industry (hypertrophy of 
mechanical engineering, industrial gigantism – 
O. Konovalova) is simply explained by the need 
to make up for depreciation of the equipment of 
Russian factories in the course of World War I and 
the civil war”. However, Chernov fairly pointed 
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out and even foresaw, if we could say so, that 
when the issue of overcoming the backwardness 
was mainly resolved in the USSR, the normal 
ratio between light and heavy industries wasn’t 
established still.
On the one hand, the reasons for such 
phenomenon were considered to be in the specificity 
of the Soviet model of social development. The 
model presupposed concentration of all forces 
and resources in the hands of the state. In 
1947 dwelling upon the phenomenon of Soviet 
modernization in his article “Objectives of a 
five-year plan and objectives of the century”, 
published in the socialist-revolutionary magazine 
“Za svobodu” (“For Freedom”), Chernov 
admitted that concentration of all power and 
resources in the hands of the state undoubtedly 
promoted a grandiose increase of all economic 
parameters, emergence of unlimited investment 
opportunities. However, the reverse side of the 
“medal” was the loss of value of the production’s 
direct profitability, alienation of the production 
from the population’s needs, and, consequently, 
hypertrophy of mechanical engineering and 
industrial gigantism (Chernov 1947).
Focusing on the model of social development, 
the frame of which made it possible for the 
Bolsheviks to step onto an industrial stage of 
the society’s development, Chernov came to the 
conclusion that there is no more capitalism in 
Russia already but there is no socialism yet as 
well. Unlike a capitalist state the Soviet state 
plays a key role in all spheres of public life, 
monopolizing power, property, and resources in its 
hands, determining prices, salaries, and dictating 
ideological and cultural priorities. Therefore, 
according to Chernov, “the Soviet economic 
regime differs from other ones by its own method 
of making use of surplus labor, surplus produce 
and surplus value” (Chernov 1942a, 12-13).
However, in this regard it is certainly not a 
socialist one as exploitation and property, which 
is neither private nor class but a state one, are 
preserved, a producer’s “diktat” over a consumer 
is carried out, individual rights and freedoms 
are limited, dictatorial and repressive methods 
of control are widely used (Konovalova 2007). 
But socialism without democracy and freedom 
is inconceivable for a socialist-revolutionary 
theorist. In 1930 he wrote: “Democracy is 
nothing more than a political side of socialism”. 
(See more: Konovalova 2001; Konovalova 2005; 
Konovalova 2006).
During the controversy on the point of 
historical processes in the USSR on pages of 
the emigrant editions Chernov wrote his article 
“K poznaniiu sovetskoi ekonomiki” (“To the 
knowledge of the Soviet economy”) in 1942. 
Basing on R. Hilferding’s ideas, he noted: “The 
Soviet system is neither a capitalist stage nor a 
socialist one, nor a transitional one which is 
considered to be mixed economy. It is something 
different – state capitalism – or etatism ... with its 
own laws of internal balance and own tendency of 
the development into a more mature, typical and 
complete form”. He qualified it as “totalitarian 
economic etatism” with “a totalitarian one-party 
state” as a special political form, corresponding 
to it” (Konovalova 2008).
The leader of the socialist-revolutionaries 
came to a conclusion that in the XX century a 
new qualitative stage emerges between a stage 
of “organizational, adjustable” imperialistic 
capitalism and socialism. It is “hyper-imperialism” 
which is considered to be state capitalism or 
etatism. Its distinctive features are strengthening 
of the role of state in public life, merging 
of financial oligarchy with the government, 
aggravation of contradictions between industrially 
developed and raw-material producing countries. 
Etatism gets special totalitarian forms in the 
countries where capitalism is introduced rather 
late and the processes of initial accumulation and 
industrialization are incomplete. The government 
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self-forgetfully surrenders itself to forcing the 
production; abnormal production “gigantism” 
and hypertrophy of heavy industry at the 
expense of light industry prosper everywhere; 
“manufacture of means of production” moves 
into the first place. This leads to the growth of 
military industry in the depths of heavy industry 
and furthers the aggravation of the international 
situation (Chernov 1942b, 37-38).
It turns out that Chernov traced an 
inextricable connection between totalitarian 
tendencies of the development of the society and 
the state and the process of modernization of the 
country. Practically it was found out that Russia 
managed to carry out strategic objectives of the 
country’s industrialization, the country had been 
facing since the end of the XIX century, only 
within the frame of a totalitarian form. 
The socialist-revolutionary linked the 
conditionality of this form of industrialization 
not only with the historical features of Russia’s 
development, but also with the strategic objectives 
of the Soviet foreign policy. Considering the 
USSR to be the main culprit in unleashing 
“the cold war”, he emphasized that equipping 
the armed forces of the USSR with the latest 
enginery to maintain the strength and power of 
the state hadn’t lost its relevance even after the 
end of World War II (Chernov 1947). It must be 
kept in mind that the opposition between the 
USA and the USSR during the years of “the cold 
war” was regarded by Chernov as not the fight 
of national and geopolitical interests but a global 
confrontation of democracy and totalitarianism. 
Idealizing the American democracy, he blamed 
the USSR for unleashing the “third” world 
war. On the one hand, such assessment was 
Chernov’s peculiar reduction of the Bolsheviks’ 
attitude towards global political processes during 
the civil war; on the other hand, the socialist-
revolutionaries’ leader obviously viewed this 
situation by “the U.S.A. citizen’s eyes”.
Conclusion
However, ideological bias didn’t prevent 
Chernov from defining fundamental features and 
nature of Stalinist modernization. He correctly 
connected them not only with the historical 
specificity but also with the geopolitical position 
of Russia. Existing in “hostile” environment, 
practically in the centre of the world, in Eurasia, 
having considerable land borders, Russia was 
compelled to support and develop its military 
potential and army in an actual state to maintain 
its political independence and civilization bases. 
This, in its turn, determined the “militaristic 
spirit” of its modernization process and proved 
the leading role of the state.
Despite his critical position towards Stalinist 
modernization, integrally negative assessment 
of the socialist construction experience in the 
USSR, Chernov didn’t support the sentiments 
which were widespread in the circles of the 
Russian emigrates and expressed in the “back 
to capitalism” slogan (Proekt… 1930, 7). The 
position of a number of prominent figures among 
the socialist revolutionaries, grouping around 
the journal “Sovremennye zapiski” (“Modern 
Notes”) and A.F. Kerensky’s newspaper “Dni” 
(“Days”), was the same. He called to be “very 
careful and cautious” towards the Soviet system’s 
socio-economic heritage. If democratic forces 
come to power in Russia, then, he urged, it 
is advisable to preserve “economically cost-
effective and socially beneficial institutions and 
enterprises of cooperative and public sectors, 
proved to be viable and effective” (Konovalova 
2009, 196). He believed that despite huge costs of 
the Bolshevik policy there is a constructive and 
important social principle for the people in them. 
Besides, the Bolsheviks succeeded in making a 
maximum use of the people’s faith in a brighter 
future in the course of modernization.
In our opinion the analysis of V.M. Chernov’s 
positions, concerning Stalinist modernization in 
– 1892 –
Оlga V. Konovalova. V. M. Chernov on “Stalin’s Modernization”
the USSR, allows to define fundamental reference 
points for modern Russian policy. These are the 
following ones:
• setting a priority objective – development 
of spiritual-and-cultural and social-and-
economic potential of an individual and 
the society; 
• need for taking cultural-and-civilization 
and historical bases and forms of 
modernization process into account; 
• a leading role of the state in determination 
of strategic directions and organization of 
financing of modernization projects;
• an optimum correlation between the 
interests of external safety and internal 
stability, prosperity of the society and the 
state;
• combination of state and private 
initiative, administrative resource and 
creative potential of society, groups 
and individuals on the “golden mean” 
principle;
• balance between administrative and 
democratic methods of regulation of 
modernization process;
• integrated systemic approach to reforming 
of industries, agriculture and service 
industry; 
• harmonization of the producers’ and 
consumers’ interests.
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